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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2007-08 called into question 
the mainstream view that price stability should be 
not merely the primary, but effectively the only 
objective of a central bank. After all, the major 
central banks, including the ECB, were quite 
successful in maintaining price stability during the 
last decade. Yet this remarkable success in keeping 
inflation low did not prevent a financial crisis from 
erupting. This leads to the question of whether 
financial stability is not equally important as an 
objective of the central bank. 
Before the emergence of the crisis the standard 
response to that question was, first, that by 
maintaining price stability the central bank did all it 
could to maintain financial stability. In other words, 
price stability was seen as a strategy that would 
minimise the risk of financial instability. Second, 
the main responsibility for maintaining financial 
stability was in the hands of the supervisors and 
regulators.  
There can be no doubt that the responsibility resting 
on the supervisors and regulators is a formidable 
one. But does this absolve the central bank from its 
responsibilities? To answer this question we have to 
formulate another one. Is it conceivable that there is 
a trade-off between price stability and financial 
stability (much in the same way as there can be a 
trade-off between price stability and output stability 
when supply shocks occur)? If there is none, the 
central bank can indeed claim that by maintaining 
price stability it does all it can to also maintain 
financial stability. If there is a trade-off between 
price stability and financial stability, the central 
bank will have to make a choice. In that case the 
issue arises of which of the two objectives should 
take precedence: price stability or financial 
stability? We analyse how such a trade-off can arise 
in Section 2. Section 3 then turns to the issue of how 
to define and monitor financial stability. Section 4 
looks at the policy instruments the ECB could 
deploy to maintain financial stability, and Section 5 
concludes. 
2.  Is there a trade-off between price 
stability and financial stability? 
Much of central banking has to do with resolving 
trade-offs. The one that has most occupied the 
attention of practitioners and theoreticians is the 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
(output growth). There is now general agreement 
that while in the short run a powerful trade-off 
exists; in the long run it vanishes. This is why 
central banks were given one target: price stability, 
and one instrument, namely the interest rate, to 
achieve it. 
Is there a similar trade-off between inflation and 
financial stability? At first sight, there does not 
seem to be a similar trade-off to the one between 
price stability and unemployment. Thus, the choice 
faced by the central bank does not seem to be 
comparable to the choice between inflation and 
unemployment. 
Nevertheless, trade-offs between inflation and 
financial stability may appear in a different form. 
Financial stability is a complex concept and more 
difficult to define than price stability, which can be 
summarised in a single number, namely CPI 
inflation. In what follows financial stability is taken 
to mean an absence of financial instability, i.e. a 
situation of distress that does not allow the financial 
and, in particular, the banking system to function 
normally.  
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In order to analyse these different trade-offs it is 
useful to trace how bubbles work through demand 
and supply, and in so doing, create trade-offs 
between inflation and financial stability.  
Let’s take the case of the IT-driven asset bubble of 
the late 1990s as our prototype bubble (see 
Kindleberger, 2000 for an analysis of similar 
technology-driven bubbles in history). A new 
technology leads to great optimism about the future 
potential of that technology. This leads to large 
increases in stock prices. These reduce the cost of 
attracting capital, which in turn increases investment 
in these new technologies. The primary effect of 
such a shock is to increase productivity so that the 
aggregate supply curve shifts to the right.   
 
Figure 1. The trade-off between price stability and financial stability due to a technology-driven shock 
 
 
The same shock, however, also increases aggregate 
demand. New technologies create new products and 
thus lead consumers to spend more. We will assume 
here that the supply effect is larger than the demand 
effect, and show this scenario in Figure 1. The new 
technology shifts demand and supply to the right 
(from AD to AD’ and AS to AS’), but the supply 
effect is stronger than the demand effect. As a result, 
in the new equilibrium given by point B, the 
aggregate price level has declined to P’. Much of the 
subsequent dynamics now depends on the policy 
regime. Suppose the central bank targets the price 
level at the level P*.
1 We then immediately see that 
the central bank will respond by a policy of 
monetary stimulus (lower interest rate, higher 
money stock) so as to raise demand and the price 
level from P’ to P*. We show this by a shift of the 
demand curve from AD’ to AD’’. The economy 
settles at point C.  
The result of this monetary accommodation is to 
keep the price level at its pre-technological shock, 
                                                      
1 Note that in practice the central bank targets inflation, 
but the argument could be phrased in terms of inflation. 
P*. Thus the central bank maintains price stability. 
The monetary stimulus, however, also increases the 
level of the asset prices even further relative to the 
position that was attained when the price level was 
P’. This creates a risk that the asset price increase 
degenerates into a bubble. Since bubbles inevitably 
lead to crashes and since financial institutions are 
usually involved in asset price inflation financial 
stability is endangered.  
There would thus appear to be a trade-off here 
between price stability and financial stability in the 
presence of a technology shock. The trade-off arises 
because the technology shock has the effect of 
reducing the aggregate price level. The central bank, 
however, targets a price level corresponding to the 
pre-technology shock level. As a result, it is forced 
to react to the shock by a monetary stimulus, 
creating an environment that makes a bubble more 
likely, while keeping the price level unchanged.
2 
                                                      
2 Borio (2003) argues that while low and stable inflation 
promotes financial stability, it also increases the 
likelihood that excess demand pressures show up first in 
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This analysis comes close to what Kindleberger has 
identified to be the main sources of the development 
of a bubble. These are first a technological 
revolution, and second a monetary accommodation. 
The two together make for the cocktail mix that in 
history most often leads to bubbles and later 
crashes.
3 
The equilibrium reached in point C is unsustainable 
(the long run equilibrium is in point B) and can 
therefore only be temporary. Output is beyond full 
capacity. It is sustained at that level by an interest 
rate that is too low and by the high level of asset 
prices that create a positive wealth effect on 
aggregate demand. Because point C is unsustainable 
a crash is inevitable. The crash leads to a decline in 
aggregate demand. It is likely to lead to an 
overreaction, as consumers and producers who have 
indebted themselves have to improve their balance 
sheets again. Thus the demand curve shifts to the 
left. A new (temporary) equilibrium is reached at 
point D. The economy is in a recession, with output 
at below full capacity. It should be noted that once 
at point D, the trade-off for the central bank 
disappears. The latter, by targeting the price level, 
will stimulate aggregate demand, thereby allowing 
the price level and the output level to increase. 
Whether this monetary stimulus is effective is 
another matter (not analysed here). Experience has 
shown that during major busts monetary stimulus 
may become ineffective (as a result of a liquidity 
trap, as in Japan in recent decades).  
The analysis underlying Figure 1 stresses the 
importance of technological shocks. The latter were 
important in explaining the IT bubble of the late 
1990s that crashed in 2001. Not all bubbles are 
technology-driven, however. The stock market 
bubble that started in 2003 and crashed in 2007-08 
does not appear to have been driven by a technology 
shock. It is not fully clear how this bubble was 
triggered. It appears though that it was mainly 
caused by a combination of ‘animal spirits’, i.e. 
optimistic beliefs of investors, and excessive credit 
creation. 
We analyse this case in Figure 2 because we believe 
this is the type of bubble most relevant to 
understanding the macroeconomic disequilibria in 
the euro zone during 2003-07. We start from the 
initial equilibrium at point C. A bubble is now set in 
motion as a result of ‘animal spirits’. This raises 
                                                                                      
credit aggregates and asset prices, rather than in goods 
and services prices. 
3 It is also the dynamics underlying the IT bubble during 
the second half of the 1990s. The US monetary 
authorities identified this shock as a productivity shock 
that tended to lower prices and thus made a monetary 
expansion desirable. See Greenspan (2007). 
stock prices and lowers the cost of capital. The 
supply curve shifts down from AS to AS’. At the 
same time the bubble in asset markets raises 
aggregate demand due to wealth effects and to the 
increased availability of credit. The latter arises 
because the banks’ balance sheets move upward 
with the bubble. The mechanism is that the higher 
price of assets increases the collateral value of these 
assets and thus the potential for bank credit. ‘Mark-
to-market’ rules reinforce this effect (both during 
the upturn as later during bust). Moreover, in the 
benign economic environment (high growth, but 
stable prices) generated by a positive supply shock, 
as risk apparently has fallen, leverage increases. All 
this implies that for any given supply of capital to 
the banking system the availability of credit
4 
increases, which increases the opportunities for 
marginal (subprime) consumers to finance 
additional consumption (or the purchase of durable 
consumer goods like cars or houses). 
This increase in the availability of credit, also often 
dubbed ‘liquidity’ implies thus that aggregate 
demand curve shifts to the right, e.g. from AD to 
AD’. We assume that these two effects are of the 
same magnitude. It does not have to be, but we use 
this assumption because it presents a useful 
benchmark. Moreover, it appears to characterise the 
case of the euro area well since the external current 
account of the euro area has remained in rough 
equilibrium over the last ten years, suggesting that 
supply and demand have moved in parallel.
5 The 
important general point is that both demand and 
supply shift. As a result, the central bank that is 
targeting P at the level P* decides that there is 
nothing to worry about. 
There is, however, a lot to worry about. The 
expansion of output is unsustainable because it is 
based on credit creation, which is linked to 
artificially high asset valuations. In addition, in this 
process of excessive credit creation, households and 
firms accumulate excessive debt which will have to 
be scaled down. This happens when the bubble 
bursts. At that moment both demand and supply 
shift to the left. They will typically undershoot 
creating a recession. All this will lead to banking 
problems and a financial crisis as all the 
mechanisms that reinforced the availability of credit 
during the boom go into reverse. 
                                                      
4 See Brunnermeier et al. (2009). 
5 The case of the US is obviously different. Its increasing 
current account deficit (until 2006 at least) shows that 
demand growth was higher than supply growth. For the 
US one would have to add to the model imports, which 
would render the supply curve (at least of tradables) 
much flatter. 4 | De Grauwe & Gros 
Figure 2. The trade-off between price stability and financial stability due to ‘animal spirits’ 
 
 
From the preceding analysis we conclude that 
important trade-offs between price stability and 
financial stability arise when technological 
developments trigger booms in asset markets or 
when ‘animal spirits’ create a cycle of booms and 
busts. A central bank that uses a lexicographic 
ordering favouring price stability over other 
objectives is likely to fuel the boom inadvertently 
(in the case of a technology-driven bubble) or will 
decide to do nothing (in the case of an ‘animal spirit 
bubble’) allowing a process of excessive credit 
creation. The latter is what happened during the last 
ten years. Major central banks (including the ECB) 
focused exclusively on price stability, and were 
quite successful in keeping inflation low. (The 
Federal Reserve did focus on financial stability only 
when financial markets (especially stock markets) 
fell and it had the feeling that a lack of availability 
of credit might hamper a recovery).
6 They failed, 
however, to see the bubbles in asset markets that 
were threatening financial stability, and that they 
fuelled inadvertently by allowing excessive credit 
creation to develop. In doing this they failed to 
achieve their ultimate objectives. These are 
situations in which central banks should have put 
their inflation target aside so as to guarantee 
financial stability.  
                                                      
6 This approach is known in the literature as the ‘benign 
neglect’. According to this view monetary authorities 
should deal with financial instability that may result from 
an asset bubble crash if and when the latter occurs. See 
Bordo & Jeanne (2002). 
We also conclude that the lexicographic ordering of 
the objectives of the ECB should be abandoned. 
Strict inflation targeting cannot be maintained 
because it can conflict with financial stability. Our 
contention is that when such a conflict arises, the 
central bank should allow its inflation target to be 
overridden by the objective of financial stability (see 
Borio & Lowe, 2002 and White, 2006 for a similar 
conclusion).
7 We do not suggest that the trade-off 
between price and financial stability is always 
present, but it is clear that this trade-off has been 
present over the last decade and has been neglected 
at great cost. 
Promoting financial stability to a level at par with 
price stability creates a number of issues, however. 
We discuss two issues here. The first has to do with 
the definition and monitoring of financial stability; 
the second with the instruments a central bank, 
including the ECB, can use to reach the objective of 
financial stability. We will not deal with the 
possible legal issues that arise from the fact that the 
statutes of the ECB may have to be changed.  
                                                      
7 This is certainly not the mainstream view. The latter is 
represented by Svensson (2002) who argues that the 
central bank should focus on its objective of price 
stability with financial stability concerns only entering an 
extreme scenario when a crisis is underway. This was 
also the Greenspan (2007) view and was very much 
influenced by Bernanke & Gertler (2000). 
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3.  How to define and to monitor 
financial stability 
While the definition of price stability and thus its 
monitoring is relatively easy, this cannot be said of 
the objective of financial stability.
8 Defining 
financial stability is more difficult than defining 
price stability because the former has different 
dimensions that do not lend themselves to be 
captured by one index in the way this is done to 
describe price stability. As a result, the monitoring 
of financial stability is also inherently more difficult 
than the monitoring of price stability (through the 
use of the Consumer Price Index).  
The literature offers few formal definitions of 
financial stability. For example, Ferguson (2002) 
defines financial stability through its opposite: 
financial instability. Financial instability is a 
situation in which: “a) some important sets of 
financial asset prices seem to have diverged sharply 
from fundamentals; and/or b) market functioning 
and credit availability, domestically and perhaps 
internationally, have been significantly distorted; 
with the result that c) aggregate spending deviates 
(or is likely to deviate) significantly from the 
economy’s ability to produce.” 
Borio & Lowe (2002) use a similar definition of 
financial instability. According to these authors, 
sustained rapid credit growth combined with large 
increases in asset prices increases the probability of 
an episode of financial instability (see also Borio, 
2003). This view of the simultaneous occurrence of 
bubble-like developments in asset markets and 
excessive credit growth as twin indicators of threats 
to financial stability is also to be found in 
Kindleberger (2000) and formed the basis of our 
theoretical analysis.
9 
In a recent paper, Alessi & Detken (2008), argue 
that credit growth at the global level is a better 
predictor for the emergence of financial crisis than 
national credit growth. This means that the ECB 
should not be looking only at euro area variables 
when it wants to evaluate potential dangers to 
financial stability. Recent experience has shown that 
excessive mortgage lending in the US can lead to 
financial distress in Europe. An institution 
                                                      
8 We are not implying that the definition of price stability 
does not create problems. See De Grauwe (2007) for a 
discussion of this. 
9 The ECB’s definition of financial stability is too vague 
to be useful in tying down its responsibilities. According 
to the ECB (2008, p. 117), “financial stability is a 
condition in which the financial system – comprising 
financial intermediaries, markets and market 
infrastructures – is capable of withstanding shocks and 
the unraveling of financial imbalances.” 
concerned with financial stability in the euro area 
should have taken this into account when setting its 
own policy. Moreover, given that euro area 
variables constitute an important share of global 
averages this result still implies that euro area 
variables contain an important signal about potential 
risks for financial stability. 
Thus by focusing on two types of variables, i.e. 
asset prices and credit growth, the monetary 
authorities can obtain important information about 
ongoing developments that can threaten financial 
stability.  
We show the evidence of the most recent episode as 
an example.  
In Figure 3 we present the stock prices in the euro 
area and the US. In both cases we observe a bubble-
like development from about 2003 onwards up to 
mid-2007, followed by a steep crash (for the US). 
Note that the bubble appears to have been as 
pronounced in the euro area as in the US.  
The bubble in stock prices appears to have 
coincided with a strong acceleration of bank credit 
from 2003 on. We show the evidence for the euro 
area in Figure 4. We observe that the yearly growth 
rates of total bank loans in the euro area increased 
from less than 4% per year in 2003 to double-digit 
growth rates during 2006-07 (which was the period 
during which stock prices reached their peaks). Thus 
during the bubble in the euro stock markets from 
2003 to 2007, during which stock prices almost 
doubled (as rents also increased the ratio of prices to 
rents shown above increased much less), bank credit 
in the euro zone increased by 60% (from 95% of 
euro area GDP to 115%).  
Thus during the period 2003-07 statistical evidence 
was available to detect threats to financial stability.
10 
The period 2003-08 showed the classic combination 
of asset price booms fuelled by excessive bank 
credit, which ultimately leads to a crash and a 
financial crisis. (See also Borio, 2003 on this issue 
with more empirical evidence of the importance of 
these twin variables to explain subsequent financial 
crisis.) We conclude that it is possible for a central 
bank to monitor the risk of financial crisis by 
focusing on a limited number of indicators, i.e. on 
indices of stock prices, housing prices and bank 
credit. 
 
                                                      
10 There were also observers at the BIS and in academia 
who, based on similar evidence, warned of imminent 
financial crises.  6 | De Grauwe & Gros 
Figure 3. Stock price indices in the euro area (Euro-Stoxx-50) and in the US (S&P-500) 
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Source: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Base, various issues. 
 
Figure 4. Growth rate of total bank loans (left) and stock price index (right) in the euro area 
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Source: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Base, various issues. 
One issue that arises here is why central bankers in 
Europe (the ECB, the Bank of England) and the US 
(the Federal Reserve) placed so little weight on 
these indicators? There are probably many factors 
that have influenced the failure of central bankers to 
detect the threats to financial stability. There is one 
factor that we wish to stress here. Central Bankers 
were ‘fed intellectually’ by macroeconomic models 
developed in academia. These models were based 
on the assumption of perfectly informed and 
superbly rational agents who cannot make 
systematic errors, and who understand the great 
complexity of the world in which they live. In these 
‘dynamic stochastic general equilibrium’ models 
(DSGE models) that are now widely used in central 
banks, bubbles and crashes cannot occur. Prices 
always reflect underlying fundamentals. There is no 
need to do anything about asset prices.  
These models tell the policy-makers to focus on 
price stability and all the rest – growth and stability 
– will be given to them by the efficient working of 
the markets.
11 Such an intellectual framework can 
                                                      
11 For a strong formulation of this view see Stark (2008) 
in a speech in November 2008: “The mandate of the ECB 
is to maintain price stability over the medium term. This A New Two-Pillar Strategy for the ECB | 7 
easily work as an intellectual device that prevents 
policy-makers from seeing emerging problems in 
the financial markets, because in the models these 
problems simply can not arise. And when they arise, 
they are just exogenous shocks that could not be 
foreseen.  
4.  Policy instruments for financial 
stability 
Giving the responsibility for financial stability to 
central banks is one thing, providing the instruments 
to achieve the objective of financial stability is quite 
another. Clearly, with just one instrument: the 
interest rate, the central bank will have great 
difficulties achieving price stability and financial 
stability, let alone output stability. In fact, adding an 
objective without giving the central bank additional 
instruments to achieve that objective is not very 
sensible. In addition, without additional instruments 
it is difficult to make the central bank accountable 
for the additional objective.  
Fortunately, there are instruments at the disposal of 
the central bank that can be used to maintain 
financial stability. These instruments are 1) legal 
reserve requirements and 2) macro-prudential 
control. We discuss these instruments below. 
Legal reserve requirements 
The ECB has the formal legal authority to impose 
the minimum reserve holdings by banks in the euro 
zone. It has, however, not used this variable as an 
instrument of monetary policy, and has not changed 
the levels of minimum reserves since the start of its 
operations.  
Required reserves work like a tax on bank deposits 
because it forces banks to hold funds equal to a 
certain percentage (at present 2%) of their deposits 
with the central banks. In the euro zone reserve 
requirements are remunerated at close to market 
rates. This was done because it was feared that 
otherwise banking business would migrate outside 
the euro area. However, reserve requirements still 
work like a tax at the margin, as can be seen from 
the fact that during normal times banks do not leave 
any excess reserves with the ECB.  
There is no reason why the ECB could not use this 
instrument in the context of its objective of 
                                                                                      
mandate must be adhered to both in normal times and in 
times of crisis. The monetary policy stance appropriate to 
fulfil our mandate depends exclusively on our assessment 
of the balance of risks to price stability, and nothing else. 
[…] There is no trade-off between price stability and 
financial stability”. For another sceptical note on the 
existence of a trade-off between financial stability and 
price stability, see Bini-Smaghi (2008). 
preserving financial stability. We propose that 2% 
would be the normal percentage to be used in 
normal times. During periods of excessive credit 
growth, like during the period 2003-07, the ECB 
could raise the minimum reserves to be held by 
banks to a higher level depending on the size of the 
credit growth. In so doing the ECB would increase 
the cost of extending bank credit and would 
discourage credit expansion in the banking system. 
Such an action would of course have been deeply 
unpopular with the banking system and might have 
led to some migration of deposits off shore. 
However, in light of recent events such a reaction 
might actually not have been contrary to the longer-
term interests of the euro area.  
If the ECB had increased reserve requirements (say 
from 2004 onwards) to rein in credit growth, 
deposits might have migrated to London. However, 
this would have actually made it easier to support 
the euro area banking system during the crisis as the 
fiscal cost of guaranteeing all these deposits would 
have had to be borne by the UK authorities.  
Macro-prudential control 
Macro-prudential control refers to the use of 
prudential control of the banks with the aim of 
achieving a macroeconomic outcome conducive to 
financial stability. The two instruments most often 
cited in this context are loan to value ratios and 
leverage ratios.  
Some form of macro-prudential control has been 
applied by a number of national central banks 
(NCBs), most prominently by the Bank of Spain, 
which has implemented a system of counter-cyclical 
reserve accumulation that required banks to set aside 
more funds for bad debt than appeared to be needed 
during the boom (so called dynamic provisioning). 
There is a consensus today that while this policy has 
not prevented a boom in the Spanish construction 
sector, it has mitigated the impact of the now 
ongoing bust in shielding the Spanish banking 
sector from taking excessive risks, thereby limiting 
the impact of the financial crisis on the sector.  
The issue that arises here is whether such a macro-
prudential control mechanism could be transferred 
to the ECB. Our opinion is that it can be done 
without having to change the statutes of the ECB. In 
our view a macro-prudential control exerted by the 
ECB should be restricted to the systemic banks that 
have activities throughout the euro zone.
12 The exact 
                                                      
12 Several members of the Governing Council have 
recently proposed to give the ECB more authority in 
supervising the systemic banks. See the Financial Times 
(2009). The ECB position on financial stability in the past 
and during the current financial crisis can be found in 8 | De Grauwe & Gros 
numbers of the banks that would fall into this 
category could be determined on the basis of 
objective criteria (mainly the size of cross-border, 
especially interbank operations). 
Transferring the authority for banking supervision to 
the ECB would not require a change in the Treaty. 
A (unanimous) decision of the Council would be 
sufficient under Article 105 of the Treaty 
(Maastricht Treaty). This might be difficult to 
achieve, but an alternative route exists: the ECB 
could simply decide that it would deal only with 
banks whose solidity it can control itself. The ECB 
could then set simple criteria (e.g. overall leverage 
and liquidity ratios) and invite banks that wish to 
participate in its tenders to open their books to the 
appropriate department in the ECB. This would de 
facto create a group of ‘clearing banks’, which 
would have the explicit stamp of approval of the 
ECB. All financially strong banks would have an 
incentive to be part of this group so there would be 
no need to force them to open their books to the 
ECB, which would then, de facto, become a sort of 
supervisor to them (because it could take away 
access to its facilities if the bank does not fulfil its 
criteria).
13 
A new two-pillar system 
The previous discussion allows us to propose a new 
two-pillar system for the ECB. This is a system in 
which the interest rate would continue to be used for 
achieving the inflation objective, while the other 
instruments (legal reserve requirements and macro-
prudential control) would be used to achieve 
financial stability. Thus we propose a separation of 
the two sets of instruments which is akin to what the 
ECB has been doing since the start of the liquidity 
crisis in the summer of 2007, when it used the 
interest rate to achieve its macroeconomic 
objectives and used quantitative liquidity provisions 
independently from the interest rate decisions. This 
allowed the Eurosystem to provide all the necessary 
liquidity independently from the interest rate. 
                                                                                      
several sources: ECB press releases and publications (see 
for example ECB, 2008; Trichet, 2008, but also Cecchetti 
& Schoenholtz, 2008). 
13 We are indebted to Tommaso Padoa Schioppa for 
pointing out this idea. We realise that it would require a 
decision of the ECB’s Governing Council to implement 
this change. Unfortunately the national central bank 
presidents have a large majority on the Governing 
Council and they face a conflict of interest: this change 
might be in the interest of the ECB (and the eurozone), 
but might not be in the interest of ‘their’ banks, many of 
which might no longer qualify for access to the ECB’s 
financing facilities.  
A similar separation would be possible between the 
use of legal reserve requirements and macro-
prudential control on the one hand, and the use of 
the interest rate on the other hand. Such a separation 
would allow the ECB to reserve the interest rate as 
the privileged instrument to control inflation (which 
is the present situation) and the other instruments, 
legal reserve requirements and macro-prudential 
controls, as the privileged instruments to maintain 
financial stability. The advantage of such a 
separation is that it would be easier for the ECB to 
handle the difficult trade-offs that can occur 
between financial stability and price stability.  
Thus the ECB could have applied such a separation 
during the period 2003-07. This would have allowed 
it to set the interest rate as its privileged instrument 
to keep inflation within the target zone. At the same 
time, observing that bank credit was increasing in an 
unsustainable way and that this coincided with 
several bubbles in asset markets, the ECB could 
have increased the minimum reserve requirements, 
lowered the loan-to-value ratio, and imposed lower 
leverage ratios on systemic banks. There is little 
doubt that this would have reduced the expansion of 
bank credit during that period. Since a large part of 
the expansion of bank credit was channelled into 
asset markets (including housing markets) this 
would also have reduced the bubbles in these asset 
markets. The attractive feature of this separation of 
instruments is that the ECB could have achieved this 
without the need to raise the interest rate. This is an 
important advantage, because the use of the interest 
rate to counter asset bubbles encounters a lot of 
political opposition and criticism. 
It will be remembered that in its initial monetary 
policy strategy, the ECB had set the growth rate of 
M3 as a reference value (intermediate target) for 
guiding the economy towards price stability. It is 
clear that this strategy has failed, as can be seen 
from Figure 5. We observe that the growth rate of 
M3 by far exceeded the reference value of 4.5% 
which was the number the ECB announced to be the 
maximum that should not be exceeded if the 
inflation target of 2% is to be achieved. The facts 
are that the ECB came very close to achieving its 
inflation objective during 1999-2008 (it was 2.2% 
on average per year) while the growth rate of M3 
wildly exceeded the 4.5% benchmark (it was 7.4% 
on average per year).  A New Two-Pillar Strategy for the ECB | 9 
Figure 5. Inflation and money growth (M3) in the euro area 
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Source: ECB, Monthly Bulletin. 
 
The failure to control the growth rate of monetary 
and credit aggregates, while inflation was very close 
to the objective of 2%, is related to the phenomenon 
documented earlier, i.e. the excessive expansion of 
bank credit that was channelled mainly into asset 
markets, while leaving goods markets relatively 
unaffected. The two-pillar strategy proposed here 
would have solved this problem and kept the growth 
rate of M3 (and of bank credit) under control while 
not driving the interest to very high levels. 
Monetary and credit aggregates refer to two 
different sides of the balance sheet of banks, 
however, in reality they tend to move together. We 
illustrate this in two ways. Figure 6 shows the 
growth rate of M3 and two credit aggregates relative 
to GDP because only strong increases in this ratio 
signal dangers to financial stability (if credit growth 
is in line with nominal GDP there is no increase in 
leverage and hence no danger to price stability). It is 
apparent that since 2003 the ratios of money and 
credit relative to GDP were increasing every rear, 
and at an increasing rate (until 2008). 
Table 1 shows the correlation coefficients between 
the ratios of M3 to GDP and different ratios of loans 
to GDP. We observe that these correlations are very 
high, which again is not surprising as they are 
different sides of the banks’ balance sheets.  
 
Figure 6. Monetary and credit aggregates in the euro area: Loans, M3 and total assets 
(annual growth rates of ratios to GDP) 
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Table1. Correlations between M3 and loans 
  Total assets/
GDP 
M3/GDP Loans/GDP
Tot assets/GDP  1    
M3/GDP 0.99 1.00   
Tot Loans/GDP  1.00 0.98  1.00
 
It is thus not surprising that in reality the ratios of 
credit aggregates to M3 (the credit/money 
multipliers) have been roughly constant. This 
suggests that the warning signs that one would have 
detected from looking at M3 would have been 
identical to those coming from broader credit 
aggregates. However, the ECB did not detect 
dangers for financial stability because of its 
exclusive focus on price stability. 
We conclude that financial stability can become an 
explicit objective of the central bank. In addition, 
the central bank has a number of instruments that 
can be geared towards this objective. There remains, 
of course, the distribution of responsibilities 
between the supervisors and the central bank. We 
have argued that part of the supervisory 
responsibility (macroprudential control) can be 
transferred to the ECB. The ECB would then have 
powerful instruments (including legal reserve 
requirements) that would allow it to control the 
growth rate of bank credit. By narrowing down the 
ECB’s responsibility to bank credit, the ECB could 
also be made accountable for excessive growth in 
bank credit.  
Our proposal does not in any way diminish the need 
to strengthen the supervisory framework in the euro 
zone. The ECB alone cannot guarantee financial 
stability. There is a need for a more effective 
supervision in the eurozone. In order to achieve 
greater effectiveness of the supervisory framework 
some further centralisation of supervision will be 
necessary. The de Larosière report (2009) provides a 
blueprint for such a stronger and more effective 
supervision in the euro zone.  
5.  Concluding remarks  
We have argued that financial stability should be an 
objective of the ECB which is at par with its 
‘primary’ objective of price stability and that at 
times there might be conflict between price and 
financial stability. We did not argue that this is 
always the case. However, booms and busts in 
financial markets have had a major influence on the 
global economy over the last decade. Preventing 
them must thus be a major task of public policy.  
The experience of the 1970s and 1980s showed that 
maintaining price stability in the face of 
unfavourable external shocks required never-ending 
vigilance and the courage to take unpopular 
decisions at times. The experience of the 1990s and 
the first decade of this century should remind us that 
maintaining financial stability also requires constant 
vigilance and even more political courage since 
measures to stop bubbles are also deeply unpopular 
and have to be taken when the danger to financial 
stability is least apparent. Moreover, it is never 
straightforward to diagnose a bubble. A central bank 
that has also among its explicit objectives financial 
stability might thus at times be wrong. It could thus 
be seen as stifling the developments of financial 
markets without a good reason. 
However, if one wants to reduce the likelihood of 
future major financial busts in the euro area one 
should accept that the ECB cannot only be 
responsible for price stability. Maintaining financial 
stability by preventing excesses in financial markets 
should be an equally important objective.  
While the objective of price stability can be 
quantified relatively easily this is much less the case 
with financial stability. Thus the pursuit of financial 
stability as an objective of the central bank involves 
more judgement. We argued though that the trends 
in two variables, asset prices and bank credit, 
usually provide a sound basis for the detection of 
dangers to financial instability.  
It is important to stress here that conflicts between 
the two objectives of price stability and financial 
stability can be resolved by making it possible for 
the ECB to use two instruments. This is the 
separation principle we propose. The ECB could 
continue to use the interest rate to achieve its 
inflation target while using reserve requirements and 
macroprudential controls to maintain financial 
stability.  
There is little reason to fear that this change would 
lead to higher inflationary expectations (or in 
general to an un-anchoring of expectations). On the 
contrary, markets would then know that the ECB 
would have an instrument to prevent asset bubbles 
from getting out of hand, which should stabilise 
expectations.  
Following the European Council meeting of June 
2009 the EU has embarked on the creation of a 
European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC, as 
proposed originally in the de Larosière Report) 
whose main task will be to monitor systemic risk in 
the financial system of the EU. It is foreseen that the 
ECB will be closely involved in the running of the 
ESRC. However, this new institution will only be 
able to issue recommendations. It will in all 
likelihood not have any instruments to prevent 
dangers to financial stability. The establishment of 
the ESRC thus does not diminish in any way the 
need to update the mandate for the ECB by adding 
financial stability as a second key objective. A New Two-Pillar Strategy for the ECB | 11 
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